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Abstract Attributes proof in anonymous credential sys-
tems is an effective way to balance security and privacy
in user authentication; however, the linear complexity of
attributes proof causes the existing anonymous creden-
tial systems far away from being practical, especially on
resource-limited smart devices. For efficiency considera-
tions,wepresent a novel pairing-based anonymous credential
system which solves the linear complexity of attributes
proof based on aggregate signature scheme. We propose
two extended signature schemes, BLS+ and BGLS+, to
be cryptographical building blocks for constructing anony-
mous credentials in the random oracle model. Identity-like
information of message holder is encoded in a signature
in order that the message holder can prove the possession
of the input message along with the validity of a signa-
ture.Wepresent issuance protocol for anonymous credentials
embedding weak attributes which are referred to what cannot
identify a user in a population. Users can prove any combina-
tion of attributes all at once by aggregating the corresponding
individual credentials into one. The attributes proof protocols
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on AND and OR relation over multiple attributes are also
given. The performance analysis shows that the aggregation-
based anonymous credential system outperforms both the
conventionalCamenisch–Lysyanskaya pairing-based system
and the accumulator-based systemwhen prove AND and OR
relation overmultiple attributes, and the size of credential and
public parameters are shorter as well.
Keywords Privacy · Anonymous credential · Attributes
proof · Aggregate signature
1 Introduction
In privacy-sensitive applications involving individuals’ date
of birth, minority and social benefit status, personal health-
care or financial data, the attribute-based authentication and
access control is more desirable because attributes are less
likely than identifiers to privacy leak. Generally, they are
encoded in binary or finite set (Amang et al. 2011; Jan and
Thomas 2008) and represented to a group instead of a person.
In such group authentication cases, it is important that service
providers be able to convince the user has the required per-
missions for accessing the services, while at the same time
the user’s attributes be proven in such a fuzzy way that only
the minimum amount of necessary attributes to accomplish
a certain goal should be collected and the identity of user is
kept uncertain as well.
Anonymous credential system has proved to meet such
security and privacy requirements (Jan and Anna 2004;
Camenisch et al. 2012; Jan and Thomas 2008). It allows
users to obtain a credential from an Issuer on a number of
attributes and prove the possession of credential to a verifier
without revealing any other information about themselves.
As an attribute credential, it also enable users to selectively
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release and prove a subset of the certified attributeswhile oth-
ers are hidden completely. The reason that they have become
so popular is that they strictly adhere to data minimization
principles: no electronic transaction should require its par-
ticipants to needlessly reveal private information (Baldimtsi
and Lysyanskaya 2012).
Industry aims at employing anonymous credential systems
on smart devices with limited computational power. Exam-
ples include smart phones and corporate- or government-
issued electronic identity cards. For efficiency considera-
tions, the existing anonymous credential systems use either
the RSA group or bilinear group, where the security para-
meters in these groups make the systems expensive for
source-limited smart devices. Such efficiency considerations
are particularly important when using anonymous creden-
tials to prove attributes which are specified in relying parties’
policy. Users can either prove the possession of all of themul-
tiple attributes, i.e., AND relation over attributes, or prove the
possession of one of the multiple attributes, i.e., OR relation
over attributes (Amang et al. 2011). For example, when sub-
mitting a resume, a person’s gender has to be a f emale, the
nationality is French, and the degree is Ph.D; while in the
other scenario, one person can enjoy the free tickets with
his ID-card only if his minority is blind or social_benefit
is unemployed or the type is kids_card. Unfortunately,
attributes proof in the existing anonymous credentials suf-
fers from linear complexity in the total number of the user’s
attributes.
The state-of-the-art solution to linear complexity of
attributes proof mainly focuses on reducing the number of
exponentiations by employing cryptographic accumulators
(Amang et al. 2011; Jan et al. 2009). They allow one to hash
a large set of inputs in a single short value, the accumulator,
and then provide evidence by an accumulator witness that a
given value is indeed contained in the accumulator. A large
set of input values can be assigned to finite-set attributes,
and an accumulator will output a constant-size value. Thus,
multiple attributes can be proved with constant complexity
in the number of finite-set attributes. However, the complex-
ity still depends on the number of string attributes, and the
size of public keys is depending on the number of attribute
values. Even more importantly, the number of extra pairings
largely increases for verifying the validity of accumulator,
so they are still far away from being practical on smart
devices.
Toovercome the efficiency constriction of attributes proof,
we consider privacy requirements for anonymous credential
systems regarding strong and weak attributes. In Abhilasha
et al. (2010), a strong attribute uniquely identifies an individ-
ual in a population, whereas a weak attribute can be applied
to many individuals in a population. Whether an attribute
is strong or weak depends upon the size of the population
and the uniqueness of the identity attribute. Examples of
strong attributes are a user’s passport number or social secu-
rity number. Examples of weak attributes are age, profession
and gender. Generally, the privacy requirements for anony-
mous credential systems consist of anonymity, unlinkability
and selective disclosure of attributes; for not loss of gen-
erality, they imply privacy protection on strong attributes.
If the privacy requirements could be relaxed in the case of
weak attributes, the efficiency of attributes proof will be
more increased as a result. Concisely, attributes are gener-
ally encoded as discrete logarithm representation in most
anonymous credentials (Jan and Anna 2004; Amang et al.
2011; Jan et al. 2009) in order that what is being signed is
an information-theoretically secure commitment of attributes
instead of the actual value of it. Such encoding method
brings much computation cost to users. It is crucial to obtain
anonymity when showing a credential embedding strong
attributes, but not economical toweak attributes because they
are inherently identification-resistant even if the values are
revealed in the clear. Therefore,we aim to construct an anony-
mous credential system particularly for weak attributes.
Such idea is novel but reasonable. On one hand, accord-
ing to the surveyed different data sets for electronic identity
cards and driver’s license cards in Jan and Thomas (2008),
we observe that only a minority of attributes are generic
string or integer which generally represent strong attributes,
whereas most attributes are either binary or taken from a
finite set of discrete values which generally represent weak
attributes. On the other hand, in attributes-based authen-
ticate and access control, weak attributes can fully meet
relying parties’ security policies. Therefore, if we distinguish
weak attributes from strong ones when constructing anony-
mous credentials, the privacy requirements can be relaxed
and the efficiency of attributes proof will be improved as a
result.
Our contributions are twofold. (1) Present two extended
signature schemes, BLS+ and BGLS+, based on Boneh–
Lynn–Shacham (short for BLS) short signature scheme
(Boneh et al. 2001) and Boneh–Gentry–Lynn–Shacham
(short for BGLS) aggregate signature scheme (Boneh et al.
2003). The possession of a input message is considered
in such schemes. The identity-like information of message
holder is encoded in a signature. Later on, the possession
of the input message can be proved along with the validity
of a signature. The security of BLS+ and BGLS+ signature
schemes is provedwhenever inputmessages to the sign oracle
are distinct or not. (2) Construct a pairing-based anonymous
credential system particularly for weak attributes, and con-
struct attributes proof protocols based on BLS+ and BGLS+
signature schemes, in the random oracle model. Users can
prove any combination of attributes all at once by aggregat-
ing the corresponding individual credentials into a single one.
The advantages of aggregate signature in public key size, sig-
nature size and verification efficiency are used to construct
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attributes proof over multiple attributes with constant com-
plexity.
This article is a revised and expanded version of Nan et al.
(2014). The main difference between this paper and Nan
et al. (2014) is that we propose more efficient cryptographi-
cal building blocks to construct anonymous credentials, i.e.,
BLS+ short signature scheme and BGLS+ aggregate signa-
ture scheme. Moreover, Nan et al. (2014) is presented in
business processes environment, while this paper focuses
on solving linear complexity problem of attributes proof on
resource-limited smart devices. The raw idea of BLS+ and
BGLS+ signature schemes is introduced in Nan et al. (2013),
however the security proof is limited; and it just presents the
construction of AND relation proof and never mention OR
relation proof ever. This paper givesmore solid security proof
and presents the security provable issuance protocol, AND
and OR relation proof protocols as well.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In
Sect. 2, we propose BLS+ and BGLS+ signature schemes
and prove them secure. In Sect. 3, we introduce weak
attributes encoding method and issuance protocol. In Sect. 4,
attributes proof protocols onAND andOR relation are given,
respectively. In Sect. 5 we analyze the performance of our
system and comparison with the conventional Camenisch–
Lysyanskaya pairing-based system and the accumulator-
based system. Section6 is the related work on anonymous
credential systems and their building blocks. The final sec-
tion is the conclusion.
2 Preliminary
In this section, we review a few concepts related to GDH
groups and bilinear maps (Boneh et al. 2001, 2003). The
following notation is used:
3 Proposed signature schemes
In this section, we propose two signature schemes as building
blocks for constructing anonymous credential system. One is
the extended BLS signature scheme, the other is the extended
BGLS aggregate signature scheme. The following notation
is used:
– G1 andG2 are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime
order p, and (G1, G2) is a co-GDH group
– g2 is a fixed generator of G2
– ψ is an efficiently computable isomorphism from G2 to
G1, with ψ(g2) = g1 and
– e is an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G1 ×
G2 → GT with bilinear and non-degenerate properties
– H is a full-domain hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1
3.1 Construction of BLS+ signature scheme
We extend the BLS short signature (Boneh et al. 2001) to be
able to construct anonymous credentials for weak attributes,
where the user binds a private value to attributes, so as
to prove the possession of credential to the verifier. The
extended BLS signature scheme, called BLS+ in this paper,
uses a full-domain hash function H to abstract a message
m ∈ {0, 1}∗. The security analysis views H as a random ora-
cle.
BLS+.KeyGen Pick random values x ∈R Z p and compute
v ← gx2 ∈ G2. The public key is v, The private key is x .
BLS+.Sign Given a private key x , a message tuple (m, r)
where m ∈ {0, 1}∗, r ∈ Z p, compute h ← H(m), σ ←
(h · g1)x , then output σ ∈ G1 as a signature.
BLS+.Verify Given a public key v ∈ G2, a message tuple
(m, r) where m ∈ {0, 1}∗, r ∈ Z p, and a signature σ ∈ G1,
compute h ← H(m), output true if e(σ, g2) = e(h · g1, v)
holds.
Theorem 1 Let (G1, G2) be a co-GDH group pair of order
p. The BLS+ signature scheme on (G1, G2) is existentially
unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attack only
if the input messages in {0, 1}∗ are distinct.
Suppose A is a forger algorithm that breaks the BLS+
signature scheme. We show how to construct an algorithm
B breaking BLS signatures that are secure under co-CDH
assumption. Algorithm B is given g2 and v, where v = gx2 ∈
G2. B simulates the challenger and interacts with forger A
as follows.
Setup B starts by giving A the generator g2 and the public
key v.
Signature queries Let (m1, r1), . . . , (mqs , rqs ), where mi ∈
{0, 1}∗, ri ∈ Z p, be signature queries issued by A. For each
i , B is given access to BLS.Sign to obtain the signatures
on mi as referred in Boneh et al. (2001). Next, B defines
σi ← H(mi )x ·ψ(v)ri . Observe that e(σi , g2) = e(H(mi )x ·
ψ(v)ri , g2) = e(H(mi ) · gri1 , v) and therefore σi is a valid
signature on (mi , ri ) under the public key v. B gives σi to A.
Output Eventually we assume A produces a valid message-
signature tuple (m f , r f , σ f ) where m f /∈ {m1, ..., mqs }.
From the verification equations, we have e(σ f , g2) =




H(m f )x · ψ(v)r f . Then, B outputs H(m f )x ∈ G1 as
H(m f )x ← σ f /ψ(v)r f . This means that a BLS signature
for a new message m f is forged, which contradicts co-CDH
assumption.
Theorem 2 Let (G1, G2) be a co-GDH group pair of order
p. The BLS+ signature scheme on (G1, G2) is existentially
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unforgeable against known-message attack where the input
tuple is (m ∈ {0, 1}∗, M ∈ G1) and the messages in {0, 1}∗
might be the same, if and only if r = logg1 M is hidden all
the way but M can be opened in the proof of knowledge, and
there is no chance for any signature requester obtaining two
different signatures on the same message m.
We show A breaks co-CDH assumption on (G1, G2).
This will contradict the fact that (G1, G2) is a co-GDH
group pair. Assume A is not given access to any sign ora-
cle, instead, it is given access to n known message-signature
tuples (m1, M1, σ1), ..., (mn, Mn, σn)under the public key v.
Note that M1, ..., Mn are uniform in G1 and are independent
of A’s view. We assume A outputs a valid message-signature
tuple (m f , M f , σ f ), where m f = mi , M f = Mi for some
i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Along with the verification equation, A also has to take
a proof of knowledge that it can open the commitment
M f , and extracts r f = logg1 M f . Assume e(σ f , g2) =
e(H(m f ) · M f , v) is accepted, since H(m f ) = H(mi ),
we have e(σ f , g2) = e(H(mi ) · M f , v). We also have
e(σi , g2) = e(H(mi ) · Mi , v), thus
e(σ f , g2) = [e(σi , g2)/e(Mi , v)]e(M f , v)
e(σ f , g2)e(Mi , v) = e(σi , g2)e(M f , v)
σ f · Mxi = σi · Mxf
g
(ri −r f )x
1 = σi/σ f
Then, A outputs g
(ri −r f )x
1 . This contradicts co-CDH
assumption if ri is hidden from A.
3.2 Construction of BGLS+ aggregate signature scheme
We modify BGLS signature scheme to construct attributes
proof protocols. The modified one, called BGLS+ signature
scheme in this paper, comprises five algorithms (KeyGen,
Sign, Verify, Aggregate and AggregateVerify). In particu-
lar, the algorithm Aggregate is on a subset of messages
from a single message holder. Without loss of generality, the
identity-like information could be distinct with each mes-
sage as required. The algorithms KeyGen, Sign and Verify
are identical to BLS+ signature scheme, while the algorithm
Aggregate and AggregateVerify are specified as follows.
BGLS+.Aggregate For the aggregating subset of messages
hold by the same user, assign to each message an index i ,
ranging from 1 to k. The user provides σi ∈ G1 on each mes-
sage tuple (mi , ri ) of his choice, where mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, ri ∈
Z p. Compute σ ← ∏ki=1 σi for k message tuples, and output
the aggregate signature σ ∈ G1.
BGLS+.AggregateVerifyGiven an aggregate signature σ ∈
G1 for an aggregating subset of messages hold by the same
user, indexed as before, the original message tuple (mi , ri )
where mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, ri ∈ Z p, and public key vi , the ver-
ifier computes hi ← H(mi ); outputs true if e(σ, g2) =∏k
i=1 e(H(mi ) · gri1 , vi ) holds.
Theorem 3 Let (G1, G2) be a bilinear group pair of order
p. The bilinear BGLS+ aggregate signature scheme on
(G1, G2) is secure against existential forgery under adap-
tive chosen-message and aggregate chosen-key model only if
the input messages in {0, 1}∗ are distinct.
Suppose A is a forger algorithm that breaks the BGLS+
signature.We showhow to construct an algorithmC breaking
BLS+ signatures. Algorithm C is given g2 and v1, where
v1 = gx2 ∈ G2. C simulates the challenger and interacts with
forger A as follows.
Setup C starts by giving A the generator g2 and the public
key v1.
Signature queries A requests a signature on some message
(m, r), where m ∈ {0, 1}∗, r ∈ Z p, under the challenge
key v1. First, C is given access to BLS.Sign to obtain the
signature H(m)x on the message m under the public key
v1 as referred in Boneh et al. (2001). Next, C computes
σ ← H(m)x · ψ(v1)r . Observe that e(σ, g2) = e(H(m)x ·
ψ(v1)
r , g2) = e(H(m) · gr1, v) and therefore σ is a valid
signature on (m, r) under the public key v1. C gives σ to A.
Output Finally, A returns additional k − 1 public keys
v2, . . . , vk , k message tuples (m1, r1), . . . , (mk, rk), and a
forged aggregate signature σ ∈ G1. The messages mi must
all be distinct, and A must not have requested a signature on
m1.
For eachmi , 2 ≤ i ≤ k,C first issues a query toBLS.Sign
to obtain the BLS signatures on mi under the public key vi ,
i.e., H(mi )x ← ψ(vi )bi as referred in Boneh et al. (2001).
Next, for each i > 1, C sets σi ← H(mi )x · ψ(vi )ri . Then,
for i > 1, e(σi , g2) = e(H(mi )x · ψ(vi )ri , g2) = e(H(mi ) ·
gri1 , vi ). So σi is a valid BLS+ signature on (mi , ri ) by the
key whose public component is vi for i > 1.
Now, C constructs σ1 : σ1 ← σ · (∏ki=2 σi )−1. Then,















H(mi ) · gri1 , vi
)
)−1
= e(H(m1) · gr11 , v1).
Thus, σ1 = (H(m1) · gr11 )x , C outputs a BLS+ signature
on a new message m1 under the private key x , which breaks
BLS+ signature.
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4 Construction of anonymous credentials
In this section, we describe a novel anonymous credential
system, where the BLS+ signature scheme is used to issue
an individual credential, and the BGLS+ signature scheme is
used to prove multiple credentials all at once.
As the variant BLS+ signature scheme is applied to
construct an anonymous credential system, the premise of
security forces the Issuer to concern such cases as follows.
The signer is able to prevent any signature requester from
having two different signatures σ1, σ2 on the same message
m. Precisely, the signer may have a record of requester’s id
and message m, and do duplication check every time when
receive a signature query. It will be denied of issuance when
such duplication is detected.
The value r is supposed to be kept private all the way. To
prevent collusion between signature requesters from forging
a signature by sharing their private values, the signer will
bind the same private value r with a user’s weak attributes
and strongones also.Given an adversary A sharing the private
value r with any colluding partner B, Awill be at a highly risk
to be impersonated by B in the case of showing a credential
on some strong attribute.
The anonymous credential system consists of two basic
protocols, i.e., issuance and showing, as well as attributes
proof protocol on logical relations over attributes. To reveal
the value of a weak attribute itself will not break anonymity
inherently, however, anonymous credential systems for weak
attributes still need to guarantee the following security and
privacy requirements.
– Unforgeability Only the prover with ownership of the
credential is accepted by the verifier in attributes proof.
Unforgeability is in compliance with the fundamental
security of signature scheme.
– Untraceability Issuers are unable to trace issued attributes
and their owners. In the otherword, issuance and showing
of a credential are mutually unlinkable.
– Unlinkability Any verifier cannot determine whether
any pair of attributes proof is conducted by the same user
even by colluding with other verifiers.
– Selective disclosure of attributesUsers can selectwhich
portions of a credential to reveal, which portions to keep
hidden, and what relations between certified items are
exposed during attribute proofs.
4.1 Attributes encoding
In general cases, an attribute implies a tuple (id, attribute
type, attribute value). The id is the identifier of the creden-
tial holder. It may be real name, pseudonym, any attribute
value being an identifier, or signature. Such identifiers are
different for each credential holder and can be identified by
the Issuer. Setting up an id with attributes makes credential
issuance more practical, because in the physical world issu-
ing authorities tend to identify the user before asserting his
attributes and issuing him a credential. In our case, the id is
mapped to M and constructed as M = gr1 where r is a secret
value chosen by the user. However, the user does not always
need to reveal his id when showing a credential or proving
attributes as far as anonymity is concerned.
Most of attribute values are corresponding to a single
attribute type in the universal attributes field. They can be
pre-defined in a finite set and generally regarded as weak
attributes; that means they can hardly identify the user in
a population. The verifier’s policy generally requires users
prove either possession of all of the multiple attributes or
possession of one of the multiple attributes. For example,
when submitting a resume, a person has to show a credential
with the multiple attributes (gender, f emale), (national-
ity, French) and (degree, Ph.D) all together embedded,
while in the other scenario, one person can enjoy the free
tickets with his ID-card only if any one of the multiple
attributes (minority, blind), (social_benefit, unemployed)
or (type, kids_card) is embedded. For simplifying attributes
proof, we assume there are not any two different attribute
labels assigned with identical values. It means we can dis-
tinguish an attribute from the value. Back to the above
examples, when submitting a resume, a person has to
show a credential with all of the multiple attribute values
f emale, French, Ph.D embedded, while one person can
enjoy the free tickets with any one of the multiple attribute
values blind, unemployed, kids_card in his ID-card.
Generally, the anonymous credential is a cryptographic
digital signature on attribute values. Prior to attributes encod-
ing, we distinguish weak attributes from strong ones. The
random oracle model can be utilized in encoding weak
attributes since the values of them are not identifiable inher-
ently and can be revealed in the clear without breaking
anonymity. The requirement of information-theoretically
secure of attribute is relaxed, so the i th attribute is encoded
as the tuple (M, H(mi )) in the random oracle model where
M = gr1 is id, instead of encoded all attributes as a dis-
crete logarithm representation. To solve linear complexity of
attributes proof, an anonymous credential only encodes a sin-
gle one attribute instead of multiple ones. It is fundamentally
aBLS+signature on a single one attribute. Thus, the signature
on the attribute tuple (M, mi ) is σi as σi = (H(mi ) · M)x .
4.2 Issuance protocol
The issuance protocol is for the signer to certify the user’s
attributes with its signing key and release a set of BLS+ sig-
natures, each of which is on a single attribute value. During
this procedure, the User generates the commitment of a pri-
vate value for each single attribute for the proof of ownership
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later on. It is sufficient for the Issuer to know the commitment
instead of the actual value of this private part, however, the
Issuer needs to verify the form of the commitment to avoid
the user’s fraud. The randomvalueswill always be kept secret
as showing the credential, and only the owner who knows it
can prove the ownership of the credential.
Common input The public parameters (p, G1, G2, GT ,
e, H, g1, g2, v), where v = gx2 , H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, attribute
values m1, . . . , mn ∈ {0, 1}∗, and the commitment M ∈ G1.
User’s input Value r ∈R Z p such that M = gr1.
Issuer’s input Signing key x .
1. The Issuer gives a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
with the User:
P K {γ : M = gγ1 }
2. For each mi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the Issuer computes hi ←
H(mi ), σi ← (hi · M)x . Thus, σi is the credential of the
attribute mi .
3. The Issuer sends σ1, . . . , σn to the User.
Theorem 4 The issuance protocol is a secure two-party
computation of a signature on a discrete logarithm repre-
sentation of gr1 under the signer’s public key.
From the signer’s point of view, this protocol is as secure
as when the user submits his signature queries in the clear.
This is because of the proof of knowledge: there exists an
extractor that can discover the value of the message being
signed, and ask it to the signer in the clear.
From the user’s point of view, since the user’s secret input
r is only used in the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of
it, the only thing that the signer finds out about the value r is
the input value M = gr1. The hardness of discrete logarithm
problem makes r = logg1 M unknown.
5 Attributes proof
In this section, we present two selective disclosure-enabled
attributes proof protocols constructed by the proposed anony-
mous credential. The user can prove (1) the possession of all
of the multiple attributes, i.e., AND relation over attributes.
(2) the possession of one of multiple attributes, i.e., OR rela-
tion over attributes.
We adopt BGLS+ aggregate signature scheme to aggre-
gate any combination of credentials into a single one.
Particularly, we consider the case when all individual cre-
dentials are issued by the single Issuer under the public
key v, that is the same case to any conventional credential
which embeds all the attributes certified by the same Issuer
together.
5.1 AND relation proof
For AND relation, it is to prove that a specified set of
attributes {a1, . . . , aL} are all certified. We define two sets
for attributes proof, AT T R and T A. AT T R is the set of
all the values of user’s attributes certified by the Issuer, i.e.,
AT T R = {m1, . . . , m N }. It is encoded in a credential Cred
which is formed as Cred = (M, AT T R, {σ1, . . . , σN }),
where M is the value of Prover’s id formed as M = gr1.
T A is made up of the values of the attributes referenced in a
proof, i.e., T A = {a1, . . . , aL}, 1 ≤ L ≤ N . It is specified
by the Verifier’s policy. The Prover may show some or all of
the attributes, however, the actual value of id remains private
at all time. Only the Prover who can prove the knowledge
of secret value r is truly the owner of credential. Therefore,
the credential constructed this way is against identity theft.
The protocol is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a
BGLS+ aggregate signature on multiple attributes.
Pre-computation Given the Issuer’s public parameters
(p, G1, G2, GT , e, H, g1, g2, v) where hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, the Verifier pre-computes h ← ∏Li=1 H(ai )
according to T A = {a1, . . . , aL}, Vm ← e(h, v) and
Vc ← e(g1, v). The Prover pre-computes Vc ← e(g1, v).
Common input: The public parameter (p, G1, G2, GT ,
e, H, g1, g2, v), hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1, T A =
{a1, . . . , aL }, Vc.
Verifier’s input: Vm .
Prover’s input: Value r such that M = gr1, AT T R =
{m1, . . . , m N }, σ1, . . . , σN .
1. The Prover aggregates the signatures of the proved





Vm ← e(h, v)
σ ←
mi ∈T A∩AT T R∏
1≤i≤N
σi
r ← r · L
2. The Prover computes a blinded version of the aggregated
signature σ : Choose a random value r ′ ∈R Z p, and blind
the signature to form σ ′ ← σ r ′ , where σ ′ is distributed
independently of everything else. Then, the Prover sends
σ ′ to the Verifier.
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3. Let Vs = e(σ ′, g2), the Prover and Verifier carry out the
following zero-knowledge proof protocol:
P K {(α, β) : Vsα = Vm Vcβ}
The Verifier accepts if the proof above is correct.
Theorem 5 The showing protocol is a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of a BGLS+ signature on multiple distinct mes-
sage tuples.
First, we prove the zero-knowledge property. The values
that the Verifier receives from the Prover in Step 2 are inde-
pendent of the actual signature: σ ′ is random in G1 because
σ ′ = σ r ′ for a random chosen r ′. Therefore, consider the
following simulator S: Choose random r ′, and set σ ′ = gr ′1 .
Then, σ ′ is distributed correctly, and so Step 2 is simulated
correctly. Then, since in Step 3, the Prover and Verifier exe-
cute a zero-knowledge proof, it follows that there exists a
simulator S′ for this step; just run S′. It shows that S con-
structed this way is a zero-knowledge simulator for this
protocol.
Next, we prove the proof of knowledge property. A knowl-
edge extractor E is exhibited to output values (a1, . . . , aL , r,
r ′, σ ), such that σ is a valid aggregate signature on (a1, gr1),
. . . , (aL , gr1). The extractor E is given access to the Prover
such that the Verifier’s acceptance probability is non-
negligible. It proceeds as follows: first, it runs for the proof
of knowledge protocol of Step 3. As a result, it obtains the
values r, r ′ ∈ Z p such that Vsr ′ = Vm Vcr .
Wewish to show that (a1, . . . , aL , gr1) andσ = σ ′r
′
satisfy
the verification equation for BGLS+under the public key pair
v: e(σ ′r ′ , g2) = ∏Li=1 e(hi gr1, v). We have:
Vs
r ′ = Vm Vcr
e(σ ′, g2)r
′ = e(h, v)e(g1, v)r














5.2 OR relation proof
TheProver needs to prove that oneof the subset of attributes is
signed in the credential. Given L items of elementary pred-
icates, i.e., ∃m j |(m j = a1) ∨ (m j = a2) ∨ · · · ∨ (m j =
aL), j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, the OR relation proof implies to prove
one of the attributes in T A, where T A = {a1, . . . , aL}, is
embedded into the user’s credential. For privacy concern,
the Verifier cannot distinguish which the particular one in
T A is. It is required that the proof of the particular attribute
m j is hidden in the proof of all L values a1, . . . , aL . In the
zero-knowledge proof of a signature on L values, only the
value of the particular one is actually signed while others are
redundant to protect it from being distinguished.
Pre-computation Given the Issuer’s public parameters
(p, G1, G2, GT , e, H, g1, g2, v) where hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, theVerifier pre-computeshi ← H(ai ), Vi ←
e(hi , v) for each ai in T A = {a1, . . . , aL} and Vc ←
e(g1, v). The Prover pre-computes hˆi ← H(mi ), Vˆi ←
e(hˆi , v) for each mi in AT T R = {m1, . . . , m N }, and Vc ←
e(g1, v).
Common input: The public parameter (p, G1, G2, GT ,
e, H, g1, g2, v) where hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
T A = {a1, . . . , aL}, Vc.
Verifier’s input: V1, . . . , VL .
Prover’s input: Value r such that M = gr1, AT T R =
{m1, . . . , m N }, σ1, . . . , σN , Vˆ1, . . . , VˆN .
1. The Prover picks the required attributes according to T A
and generates a subset {V1, . . . , VL} from {Vˆ1, . . . , VˆN }.
2. Suppose the Prover wants to prove m j = ak where
j ∈ {1, . . . , N }, k ∈ {1, . . . , L}. It chooses a random
value r ′ ∈R Z p and generates a blinded version of the
corresponding signature, σ ′ ← σ j r ′ , then sends σ ′ to the
Verifier.
3. Let Vs = e(σ ′, g2), the Prover and Verifier carry out the
following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
P K {(α1, α2, . . . , αL , β) : Vs = V α11 V α22 . . . V αLL Vcβ}
The Verifier accepts if the proof above is correct.
Theorem 6 The OR relation proof protocol is a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of a BLS+ signature.
First, we prove the zero-knowledge property. The values that
theVerifier receives from theProver in Step 2 are independent
of the actual signature: σ ′ is random in G1 because σ ′ = σ r ′
for a random chosen r ′. Therefore, consider the following
simulator S: Choose random r ′,and set σ ′ = gr ′1 . Then, σ ′
is distributed correctly, and so Step 2 is simulated correctly.
Then, since in Step 3, the Prover and Verifier execute a zero-
knowledge proof, it follows that there exists a simulator S′
for this step; just run S′. It shows that S constructed this way
is a zero-knowledge simulator for this protocol.
Next, we prove the proof of knowledge property. We
must exhibit a knowledge extractor E that, given access to
a Prover such that the Verifier’s acceptance probability is
non-negligible, outputs (a1, . . . , aL , w1, . . . , wL , r, σ ), such
that σ is a valid signature on (a1, gr1), . . . , (aL , g
r
1). Given
such a Prover, the extractor proceeds as follows: first, it
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runs for the proof of knowledge protocol of Step 3. As a
result, it obtains the values w1, . . . , wL , r ∈ Z p such that
Vs = V w11 V w22 . . . V wLL Vcr .
Case I [∃w j = 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , L},∀wi = 0, i ∈
{1, . . . , L}, i = j]: we wish to show that (a j , gr/w j1 ) and
σ = σ ′1/w j satisfy the verification equation for the BLS+
signature scheme: e(σ ′1/w j , g2) = e(h j gr/w j1 , v) where
h j = H(a j ). We have:
Vs = V w11 V w22 . . . V wLL Vcr
e(σ ′, g2) = e(h j , v)w j e(g1, v)r
e(σ ′1/w j , g2) = e(h j gr/w j1 , v)
Case II [∃{w j = w = 0}, j ∈ {1, . . . , L},∀wi = 0, i ∈
{1, . . . , L}, i /∈ { j}]: we wish to show that ({a j }, gr/w1 ) and
σ = σ ′1/w satisfy the verification equation for the BGLS+
signature scheme: e(σ ′1/w, g2) = ∏w j =w1≤ j≤L e(h j gr/w1 , v),
where h j = H(a j ) for each j . We have:
Vs = V w11 V w22 . . . V wLL Vcr
e(σ ′, g2) =
w j =w∏
1≤ j≤L
e(h j , v)
we(g1, v)
r






e(σ ′1/w, g2) =
w j =w∏
1≤ j≤L






r j = r
Case III [∃w j = w = 0, j ∈ {1, . . . , L},∀wi = w, i ∈
{1, . . . , L}, i = j]: Let r ← r · L , we wish to show that this
case is negligible. We have:
Vs = V w11 V w22 . . . V wLL Vcr





w j , v)e(gr1, v)




w j /w, v)e(gr/w1 , v)
e(σ ′1/w, g2) =
i = j∏
1≤i≤L
e(H(ai )H(a j )
w j /w, v)e(gr/w1 , v)
Thus, σ ′1/w = ∏i = j1≤i≤L H(ai )x (H(a j )w j /w)x (gr/w1 )x , then,
σ ′1/w is the valid BGLS+ signature on {(ai , gri /w1 )|1 ≤ i ≤
L , i = j} and (a∗, gri /w1 ), where ri = r/L and H(a∗) =
H(a j )w j /w. It contradicts the collision resistance property
of hash function.
6 Efficiency
In this section, we compare the efficiency of AND and OR
relationproofwith the conventionalCamenisch–Lysyanskaya
pairing-based system (short for CL system) (Jan and Anna
2004), accumulator-based system (Amang et al. 2011) and
our aggregation-based anonymous credential system. The
computational complexity with respect to the number of
exponentiations and pairings is mainly considered, while the
multiplication and hash function is omitted, since the costs of
them are much smaller. The following parameters are used.
N : the total number of the attributes certified by the Issuer.
L: the number of the attributes referenced in a proof.
NS : the total number of the string attributes out of N .
L S : the number of the string attributes, out of L , referenced
in a proof.
The bilinearmaps used in theCL system and accumulator-
based system is e : G1 × G1 → GT , while in our
aggregation-based system is e : G1 × G2 → GT .
E(G1): exponentiations on G1.
E(GT ): exponentiations on GT .
Table 1 shows the total number of exponentiations inAND
relation proof with different systems. It is the addition of
randomization of a signature, generation of a proof and ver-
ification of a proof. The first two parts are related to the
Prover, while the last one is related to the Verifier. In our sys-
tem, the number of exponentiations in AND relation proof
is constant with the number of attributes, whether they are
string or finite-set.
Table 2 shows the total number of pairings inANDrelation
proof with different systems. It is the addition of generation
a proof and verification of a proof. In our system, the number
of pairings in AND relation proof is 3 and outperforms the
accumulator-based system with constant complexity.
Table 3 shows the total number of exponentiations in
OR relation proof between the accumulator-based system
and our aggregation-based system (there is no OR relation
proof presented in the conventional CL system). It is the
addition of randomization of a proof, generation of a proof
and verification of a proof, as the same as AND relation
proof. In the accumulator-based system, encoding finite-set
attribute values does not need any exponentiation due to accu-
mulator, while encoding a string attribute on the base also
needs to be computed by the Verifier every single time. Both
the accumulator-based system and our aggregation-based
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Table 1 Number of exponentiations in AND relation proof
CL system Accumulator-based system Aggregation-based system
Prover (4 + 2N )E(G1) + (2 + N − L)E(GT ) 24E(G1) + (NS + 15)E(GT ) E(G1) + 2E(GT )
Verifier L E(G1) + (N − L + 3)E(GT ) (NS + 20)E(T ) + 15E(G) 3E(GT )





Prover 2 + N − L 4 2
Verifier 6 + 5N − L 13 1







E(G1) + (L + 1)
E(GT )
Verifier (NS + 69)E(GT ) (L + 2)E(GT )







system have linear complexity with respect to exponentia-
tion in OR relation proof, however, the aggregation-based
one costs less than the accumulator-based one as long as
E(G1) + (2L + 3)E(GT ) ≤ 47E(G1)+(2NS +95)E(GT ).
Note that the finite-set attributes dominate the attribute types
and the string attributes take up relatively smaller portion;
besides, the exponentiation cost on GT is larger than that on
G1. Using an example of eID as in Jan and Thomas (2008)
where NS ≤ 5, N ≤ 45 (thus L ≤ 45), the aggregation-
based system outperforms the accumulator-based system.
Table 4 shows the total number of pairings in OR rela-
tion proof between the accumulator-based system and our
aggregation-based system. Pre-computation removes the
pairings which are irrelevant to the randomized signatures. In
our system, the number of pairings in OR relation proof is 2
and outperforms the accumulator-based systemwith constant
complexity.
Regarding the public parameters to construct an anony-
mous credential embedding N attributes, (p, G1, GT , e, g1,
gT , X, Y, {Zi }, {Wi }) where 1 ≤ i ≤ N are generated in the
CL system, (p, G1, GT , e, g, g˜, gˆ, {gi }, {h j }, {S˜k, T˜k, U˜k,
F˜k}, z, Y, Y˜ , Yˆ , Y˜ ′, Yˆ ′), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2NF , i = NF +1, 1 ≤ j ≤
NS +1, 1 ≤ k ≤ NF , where NF is the total number of finite-
set attribute types, are generated in the accumulator-based
system, while (p, G1, G2, GT , e, H, g1, g2, v) are gener-
ated in our aggregation-based system. We can see that the
length of the public parameters in our system becomes con-
stant.
Regarding the length of signatures with respect to the
number of attributes n, there are totally 2n + 3 signatures
in the CL system, formed as (a, {Ai }, b, {Bi }, c). There are
totally 8 signatures in the accumulator-based system, formed
as (A, S, T, U, F, x, w, r). There are totally n signatures in
our aggregate-based system, formed as {σi }. It turns out the
aggregate-based system costs linear complexity for issuing
and storing the signatures. However, when proving multiple
attributes, there are only one aggregate signature involved.
Therefore, our system has the shortest length of signatures
in the context of attributes proof.
7 Related work
Anonymous Credential can provide strong authentication,
minimal information/data disclosure, and ensure correctness
of the data revealed. It was proposed by Chaum (1985) and
fully implemented by Brands (Stefan 1993) and Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya (Jan andAnna 2004). Brands (Stefan 1993)
made use of blind signatures. Such constructions are secure
in the randomoraclemodel and very practical.Unfortunately,
the resulting credentials are one-show. They are implemented
by Microsoft in their U-Prove technology. Camenisch and
Lysyanskaya (Jan and Anna 2004) made use of group signa-
tures. The resulting anonymous credential systems (short for
theCL system) are less efficient than theBrands’, but they are
multi-show since they use the inherent unlinkability property
of group signatures. This technology is implemented by IBM
for their Idemix product.
In recent years, cryptography based on bilinear mappings
has greatly progressed. The structure of signature can be
simplified by the properties of bilinear mappings. A lot of
pairing-based anonymous credential systems have been pro-
posed. Belenkiy et al. (2008); Malika et al. (2011); Nguyen
and Safavi-Naini (2005) presented non-interactive anony-
mous credentials which can be used for non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof on bilinear mapping groups. Norio
et al. (2008) presented an efficient anonymous credential
system which provides anonymity, unlinkability and com-
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putational unforgeability under the strong Diffie–Hellman
assumption. An anonymous credential is fundamentally a
digital signature. Many signature schemes have been put
forward to construct it, such as BB signature in Jan et al.
(2009), CL signature in Jan and Anna (2004), and vari-
ant BB signatures in Amang et al. (2011). Similar to our
approach, Abhilasha et al. (2010) used BGLS aggregate
signature scheme to prove multiple credentials all at once
for identity verification, however, their work is for the real
name authentication instead of anonymous authentication.
Sébastien and Roch (2011) used indexed aggregate signa-
ture to the anonymous credential system which efficiently
enables a user to prove the possession, in an untraceable
way, of several credentials issued by possibly several organi-
zations.However, they did not focus particularly on attributes
proof like in our work.
Strong authentication and according authorization based
on certified attributes is paramount for protecting critical
information and infrastructures online. Camenisch et al.
(2013) propose privacy-preserving attribute-based creden-
tials (Privacy-ABCs) in authentication and authorization
systems. Our work can provide an efficient solution in its lan-
guage framework to construct an anonymous credential sys-
tem and related attributes proof protocols. Concerned about
attributes proof, Li and Li (2006a, b) proposed oblivious
attribute certificates (OACerts) and oblivious commitment-
based envelope (OCBE), the user obtains a service if and only
if the attribute values satisfy the service provider’s policy, yet
the service provider learns nothing about the actual value of
attribute. Abhilasha et al. (2010) presented the multi-factor
identity attributes verification scheme with hidden commit-
ments. Yan and Dengguo (2012) used anonymous credential
to propose an anonymous credential with constant complex-
ity attribute proof. Compared with other constant complexity
pairing-based systems, our system can support more types of
attribute relationswhile the public parameter ismuch shorter.
Other works related to minimal information disclosure,
which are also our privacy requirement, are as follows. David
et al. (2008) proposed using a Merkle hash tree structure,
whereby it is possible for a single certificate to contain
many separate claims or attributes, each of which may be
proved independently, without revealing the others. Federica
et al. (2009) supported selective and incremental disclosure
of identity attributes, while minimal credential disclosure
guarantees that only the attributes necessary to complete the
online interactions are disclosed. Patrik et al. (2011) proposed
an adequate claim language specifying which certified data
a user wants to reveal to satisfy a policy and provides trans-
lation algorithms for generating the anonymous credentials
providing the data to be revealed.
Efficiency considerations are importantwhenusing anony-
mous credentials for attributes proof. The CL system suffers
from the linear complexity in the total number of attributes.
The state-of-the-art of attributes proof mainly focuses on
reducing the number of exponentiations related to binary
or finite-set attributes. Jan and Thomas (2008) extended the
CL system on the strong RSA assumption for boosting the
efficiency. It compresses binary and finite-set attributes into
a single attribute base. The core idea is to encode discrete
binary and finite-set values as prime numbers, and use the
divisibility property for efficient proofs of their presence or
absence. Jan et al. (2009) and Man et al. (2009) adopted
the cryptographic accumulator to solve the linear complex-
ity. Amang et al. (2011) extended the accumulator to prove
AND and OR relation with constant complexity in the num-
ber of finite-set attributes. To the best of our knowledge,
although they can remove exponentiations related tofinite-set
attributes proof, the complexity with respect to exponentia-
tions still depends on the number of string attributes; while
the number of pairings has to be largely increased to verify
the validity of accumulator, and the size of public parameters
is very long; so they are still far away from being practical
in resource-limited environment.
8 Conclusion
Weconstruct a novel pairing-based anonymous credential for
weak attributes in the random oracle model, the efficiency
of which is improved by utilizing the concept of aggrega-
tion. The proposed anonymous credential only encodes a
single attribute, instead of multiple ones like in the exist-
ing systems. It allows the prover to prove any combination
of attributes in one round by aggregating the corresponding
credentials into a single proof. As cryptographic building
blocks, BLS+ signature scheme is presented to construct an
individual credential, and BGLS+ signature scheme is pre-
sented to prove multiple credentials all in one round. The
result of efficiency analysis shows that, the number of expo-
nentiations and pairings in AND relation proof is constant
with the number of attributes, no matter whether they are
string attributes or finite-set attributes. On the other hand,
althoughour aggregation-based systemhas linear complexity
with respect to exponentiation inOR relation proof, it outper-
forms the accumulator-based system in the general case of
eID, where the total number of certified attributes amounts to
about 45. Additionally, the number of pairings in OR relation
proof is kept only oncewith the number of attributes, and out-
performs the accumulator-based system which is also with
constant complexity. Furthermore, the signature and public
parameters in our system are shorter.
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